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ABSTRACT 
Rarely do discussions on state-society relationship meet with discussions 
on street-level encounters between members of civil society and state 
agents. This article intends to bridge this gap by discussing state-society 
relationships in Greece as they can be understood from a pattern of 
minor illegalities from the part of both state agents and members civil 
society, and non-enforcement. The approach consists in building from 
that pattern an ideal-type of mutual hostility and controlled negative 
reciprocity between state and society. Albeit produced through a 
multitude of unconnected and uncoordinated interactions between 
members of civil society and public rules/public agents, a relationship of 
controlled negative reciprocity holds as a coherent pattern, already 
discussed in previous works by Simmel, Campbell, Clastres and 
Gouldner. This ‘ideal-type’ contributes both the literature on state 
society relationships and the literature on regulatory encounters, and it 
sheds new light on contemporary Greece before and during the crisis. 
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Controlled negative reciprocity between  
the state and civil society: the Greek case 
 
1. Introduction 
When scholars write about state-society relationships, they often write 
about the various patterns of policy-making that might involve or not 
involve societal actors. In other words, they tend to write about 
‘governance’, and about the intermediary organisations – political 
parties, associations, or unions – that exist at the intersection between 
the state and civil society to coordinate action (e.g. Yee 2004; see review 
in Sellers 2010). Rarely do they write about the multiple occurrences 
where state demands for particular behaviours – whether in the form of 
legal obligations, non-legal authoritative requests (Pyrcz 1981) or gentler 
nudges – are met positively or negatively by individuals or organizations. 
They also tend to ignore how the state itself responds to individual 
expectations, whether in terms of law enforcement, benefits, or other 
services. Yet, these micro-level occurrences abound, and they are 
unquestionably instances of routine and non-routine interactions 
between the state and society.  
The literature that has focused on the micro-level of street-level 
encounters between regulator and regulatee has also generally failed to 
build a link with the higher order and macro-level of state-society 
relationships.  Thus, regulation studies have looked at regulatory 
encounters often from a limited (and, one might add, sometimes partial) 
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point of view, either taking the perspective of the state as a regulator 
developing strategies and using policy tools to modify behaviours (e.g. 
Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Hawkins 2002), or the perspective of the 
individual person or firm as a decision-maker within a more or less 
complex environment (e.g. Bednar 2006; He 2005). Only very few 
scholars in that stream of research have strived to conceptualise the 
relationship between discrete compliance or non-compliance as 
inscribed within a broader relationship or ‘contract’ with the state (but 
see Feld and Frey 2007; Scholz 2003; Tyler 1990). In sum, there still is 
very little link between the macro-level analysis of ‘state-society 
relationships’ and micro-level dynamics of encounters between 
members of civil society and the state. 
This article aims to provide the beginning of an answer to the call for 
covering this gap (Sellers 2010). In other words, the goal here is to 
improve our understanding of state-society relationships by drawing 
inferences from empirical elements on compliance as well as 
enforcement. The argumentative strategy adopted in the paper consists 
in exploring one particular case and on that basis building inductively an 
ideal-type: a logical caricature of an otherwise messy reality. To further 
strengthen that ideal type, the paper also draws on the existing 
literature, particularly in theoretical sociology and anthropology. 
This can only be a first step in the development of a testable theory on 
the relation between the micro-level of compliance behaviour and the 
macro-level of state-society relationships, and it certainly implies a 
trade-off between descriptive accuracy and parsimony. However, it is a 
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worthy step to take, notably in order to go beyond ‘universal’ models, 
particularly in regulation studies.  
Indeed, for the most part and until recently, theories in that field have 
conceptualised relationships between members of civil society on the 
one hand and the law and enforcement authorities on the other hand on 
the basis of empirical material drawn from a limited number of cases: 
chiefly from North America, Western Europe, Australia and Japan (e.g. 
Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Hawkins 2002; Kagan and Axelrad 2000). 
Hence, much of the debate on compliance/non-compliance and 
regulator-regulatee relationships has developed in relation to developed 
countries sharing common characteristics such as a mature state with 
strong institutions, the rule of law, and an individualised society with 
relatively weak social networks. As a result, theories developed in these 
contexts, although they were drawn in universalistic terms, have had 
difficulties accounting for the reality of responses to law and state-
society relationships in countries that do not share these characteristics 
(e.g. Gezelius and Hauck 2011; He 2005).  
As an alternative strategy, ideal-types of interactions between the state 
and civil society can contribute to dealing with the problem of 
insufficient empirical variation, which has plagued research in regulation 
studies. Indeed, ideal-types offer the possibility of beginning to theorise 
diversity between groups of cases in a parsimonious way. Hence, one 
can make sense of the fact that in certain state-society contexts, 
particular (non)compliance and (non)enforcement behaviours will be 
considered normal and not trigger negative reactions, while in others 
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these same patterns will be seen as abnormal/deviant and will be 
condemned (Etienne 2013). 
The case studied in this paper is Greece. In particular, the paper explores 
the combined patterns of multiple and widespread occurrences of minor 
illegality from the part of both members of civil society and public 
administration, and the non-enforcement of many of these illegalities. It 
is proposed to interpret these patterns as a form of state-society 
relationship. The Greek case is particularly well suited to discuss the link 
between state-society relationships and micro-level encounters between 
members of civil society and state demands. Indeed, the crisis that has 
engulfed Greece and the Eurozone after 2010 has been an occasion for 
many commentators, journalists and public officials to argue that there 
was indeed a link between failure at the macro-level – the 
uncontrollable debt of the state and its incapacity to steer society 
towards reform – and a multitude of small illegalities from the part of a 
large proportion of the Greek population, in particular in relation to tax. 
In other words, these individually unremarkable behaviours of tax 
evasion have been linked to the very remarkable quasi-bankruptcy and 
ineffectiveness of the state. This jump from the aggregate micro-level 
behaviours and the macro-level has been, however, often discussed in 
moral terms (as in a name and shame process).  
Alternatively, I will propose in this paper to describe and make sense of 
the relationship between state and society for a large proportion of 
Greeks in the terms of mutual hostility and controlled negative 
reciprocity. A relationship of hostility between state and society is one 
where regular, repeated interactions are characterised by non-
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cooperation, non-enforcement, and non-violence. Social theory provides 
additional hints as to why such a relationship might make state and 
society coexist and hold together. The idea of a relationship of hostility 
between state and society is also intended to contribute mapping a 
research agenda for scholars interested in policy failure and regulatory 
non-compliance in Greece and elsewhere. Hopefully, it should also 
contribute to enlightening the public debate on the Greek crisis.   
Method and data 
The elaboration of an ideal-type of state-society relationships in Greece 
on the basis of evidence of compliance and enforcement behaviours is 
an inductive process, which regroups salient empirical elements 
together. As such it works also by excluding empirical elements that do 
not ‘fit’ together, and may be used in turn to constitute other types 
(Schnapper 1999). Although the core of the article focuses on one 
particular type, I will discuss briefly in the discussion section other types 
that might also be identified or have been identified in the Greek 
context. 
There is little systematic data on the extent of non-compliance and non-
enforcement in Greece. So far, the published scholarly literature on 
street-level encounters between members of civil society and public 
rules or state agents have been mostly impressionistic and based on 
little empirical data (but see Spanou 1996 as a rare exception that 
focuses on the case of environmental regulation). However, one can also 
find multiple small pieces of evidence in journal articles, the published 
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literature, and the Greek Ombudsman’s annual reports, which together 
contribute to drawing an impressionistic picture of the case. 
As for journalistic sources, I have consulted the archives of the periodical 
Kathimerini. Kathimerini is a centre-right daily whose editorialists and 
journalists have been regularly reporting on common, street-level 
‘lawlessness’ and on the lack of enforcement from the part of the state. 
Another periodical could also have been consulted for that purpose, and 
the main reason for looking at Kathimerini was convenience: the 
archives of the journal are freely accessible online.
1
  To identify 
examples of non-compliance (and non-enforcement), a thematic search 
in the journal’s news articles
2
 from the early 2000s was done, which 
provided a variety of examples. Articles that were published between 
2000 and 2010 were consulted preferably, in order to provide 
descriptive evidence that was recent yet not tainted by the context of 
the crisis.  
In parallel, I have also consulted the annual reports of the Greek 
Ombudsman (Synigoros tou Politi) between 2000 and 2010. The Greek 
Ombudsman is an independent authority in charge of investigating 
‘individual administrative actions or omissions or material actions taken 
by government departments or public services that infringe upon the 
personal rights or violate the legal interests of individuals or legal 
entities.’ (Greek Ombudsman website) As such, its annual reports 
provide a glimpse of a range of behaviours observable in encounters 
between members of civil society and the state. 
                                                 
1
 http://www.kathimerini.gr/editions   
2
 Using the keyword ‘lawlessness’ / ‘paranomia.’ 
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Additional sources included the published anthropological literature on 
contemporary Greece (particularly the work of Mike Herzfeld and Renée 
Hirschon) and a variety of articles and working papers on minor 
illegalities, particularly tax avoidance (e.g. Artavanis et al. 2012; 
Mistopoulos and Pelagidis 2012; Skouras and Christodoulakis 2011). The 
theoretical references consulted to make sense of the patterns 
described in that literature as well as in the press include Georg 
Simmel’s theoretical sociology (1955), the ethnographic work of the 
anthropologist John K. Campbell (1964), the anthropology of Pierre 
Clastres (1987) and the organizational sociology of Alvin Gouldner 
(1954). 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the pattern 
of behaviours that has been identified to build the ideal-type. Then, 
theoretical flesh is added on empirical bones to make sense of that 
pattern as a particular type of state-society relationship. The final 
section is for discussion and conclusions. 
2.  Identifying the pattern  
From a bottom-up point of view that looks at encounters between 
agents of the state and members of civil society (individuals or firms) in 
Greece, this tentative first approach to the question of state-society 
relationships in that country has identified four striking facts: (1) the 
extent of non-compliance with a variety of public rules from the part of 
members of civil society; (2) the extent of acts performed by state 
agents that are illegal or harmful for the public; (3) the minor nature of 
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the more widespread illegalities; (4) the pattern of non or weak 
enforcement in response to minor illegalities. 
2.1 Illegalities from the part of members of civil society  
There have been a few areas where public regulations have been flouted 
in remarkable ways, either because non-compliants have been a great 
many, or because non-compliance has been highly visible and easy to 
detect. Among them, tax and benefit fraud are the best known and also 
the best documented types of widespread non-compliance. Evasion of 
income tax and value added tax has been widespread among the self-
employed (doctors, engineers, private tutors, accountants, financial 
service agents, lawyers), hotels, bars and restaurants (Kathimerini, 
19/02/2006; Artavanis et al. 2012). Conservative estimates put unpaid 
taxes to an average 20 billion Euros per year. 
Non-compliance has also been extensive in building construction: it was 
estimated in 2006 that 1.75m houses (out of an estimated total of 6.9m) 
had been built illegally by various individuals or organisations, and 
notably property developers and the Orthodox Church (Kathimerini, 
12/02/2006; Kathimerini, 05/08/2006; Kathimerini, 25/07/2002).  
Businesses have been illegally operated on a large scale and frequently 
in very visible ways too. For instance, an open quarry has operated for 
30 years in the outskirts of Athens without a license, in spite of judicial 
orders to close it down (Kathimerini English edition, 19/07/2007). 
Glyfada, a wealthy suburb of Athens benefiting from a long coastline, 
has also seen the illegal construction of several nightclubs and bars in 
the mid-1990s. These nightclubs were not only constructed on non-
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constructible land, but they have also operated for years without any 
license. Similar observations can be made in the Psyrri Area in Athens, a 
part of the city centre with a thriving nightlife (Kathimerini, 02/02/2006). 
Another illustration concerns legislation applicable from the early 2000s 
that has made it compulsory for car owners to replace old exhaust pipes 
with catalytic ones. As of 2001 a very large proportion of drivers in 
Athens (an estimation of 50% of them) had not complied with that 
legislation. Drivers had to bring their car to dedicated bureaus to 
complete and annual technical control, yet this too had failed to tackle 
the problem, either because drivers had skipped the annual visit, or had 
found a way to obtain a bill of health in spite of not having replaced the 
exhaust pipe on their cars. 
2.2 Illegal or harmful acts from the part of state agents 
In parallel to extensive non-compliance in a number of areas, 
bureaucratic caprice and the state’s circumvention of its own rules have 
been a salient characteristic of street-level state-society interactions in 
Greece (Herzfeld 1992: 139s), as revealed by a reading of the annual 
reports of the Greek Ombudsman. For instance, in the 2008 Greek 
Ombudsman annual report, it is noted that ‘in some cases, the 
administration circumvents legal requirements in order to advance its 
own interests (e.g. collection of debts, non-disbursement of sums) 
promptly; it thus disregards the adverse consequences to citizens.’ 
(Greek Ombudsman 2008: 47).  
Among various types of illegal behaviours, a notable one is the habit for 
the state or municipalities not to pay suppliers in time. This habit of 
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delaying payments was observable even before the crisis and the 
shortage of public funds that has accompanied it, and thus cannot be 
explained only as a result of financial constraints on public finances 
(Greek Ombudsman 2010: 33). For instance, it was a key theme of the 
Greek Ombudsman’s annual report in 2005. Payment delays were 
legalized by various legal reforms in the early 2000s (e.g. Kathimerini, 
09/11/2005).
 3
 Other cases have included uncompensated expropriation 
(e.g. Kathimerini, 04/03/2005; Greek Ombudsman, 2005: 41). 
Besides, it has been frequent for citizens to be asked for payments in 
cash at public service counters in order to access or speed up access to 
public services. The system of the fakelaki (the ‘small envelope’ 
containing the required sum) is a correlate of the queue system created 
by many administrations to delay access to services (pensions, permits, 
etc.). Particularly developed in the public health sector, it can be 
experienced as extortion, such as in situations of need.
4
 Extortion has 
been rife in the tax domain as well. Thus, it has not been uncommon for 
tax collectors to request a direct payment to themselves from taxpayers 
in exchange for a very substantial reduction of the latter’s liability to the 
state (e.g. Artavanis et al. 2012). 
In other words, it is not only members of civil society who have been 
breaking the rules on a routine basis. The state and its representatives 
                                                 
3
  ‘The state, in other words, is privileged compared to what applies to all other parties. It 
can well owe millions to a company and instead of paying back, ‘go after’ that company 
because it has not paid the VAT corresponding to the above amount!’ (Kathimerini, 
09/11/2005; my translation) 
4 
Two crowd-sourcing websites have started collecting evidence of the fakelaki system in 
Greece, and provide indications of the circumstances of requests for cash and amounts 
requested from citizens at public service counters. http://www.edosafakelaki.org/ ; 
http://www.teleiakaipavla.gr/  
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have also done so actively by taking steps that have had a negative 
impact on members of society. This has arguably nurtured a general 
feeling of mutual distrust between members of civil society and the 
public administration.
5
 As Nikiforos Diamandouros, then the outgoing 
Greek Ombudsman, noted in 2003: ‘The citizen does not trust the state 
and the state does not trust the citizen.’ (Kathimerini, 09/02/2003, my 
translation). 
2.3 Self-restraint in non-compliance 
Although there has been much defiance of public rules and public 
authorities, most members of civil society have also exercised a measure 
of self-restraint in their defiance. Thus, state agents would generally not 
be harmed physically (prosecution and punishment would generally 
ensue when state agents are physically attacked, as for instance after a 
memorable episode in the Cretan village of Zoniana in 2007.)
6
  More 
generally, laws forbidding crimes against persons or property would 
generally be complied with. Thus, crime statistics for Greece compared 
with those of other EU countries are not suggesting that Greece has 
generally been doing much worse than others with regard to violent 
crimes such as homicide, rape, or robbery, although the picture has 
tended to darken in the late 2000s.
7
 This might be interpreted as the 
effect of deep-seated and informally sanctioned social norms, which 
command behaviour that is also required by law (such as the 
                                                 
5
 Public institutions have been suffering from comparatively lower levels of trust in Greece 
than in other European states (e.g. Jones et al. 2008). 
6
 http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_21/08/2011_403030; accessed 
19 November 2012. 
7
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Crime_trends_in_detail; 
accessed 19 November 2012. 
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condemnation of rape, murder, etc.) but exist in parallel to the law (e.g. 
Ellickson 1991; Gezelius 2003).
8
 Rather, the common man’s (if there is 
such a thing) illegalities have been generally limited to domains and 
activities that may harm state coffers or generally defeat the production 
of public goods (e.g. universal health care, sustainable pensions, 
sustainable public transportation, low pollution, urban planning, etc.), 
but would not harm other members of civil society, or at least not 
directly or visibly.
9
  
2.4 Self-restraint in enforcement  
The state has also exercised self-restraint in the sense that enforcement 
agents have been used not to sanction minor illegalities, including not 
enforcing judicial decisions condemning violators. As noted in a 
commentary on the Greek Ombudsman’s 2003 report, there is a distinct 
pattern of state inaction when it comes to small illegalities: ‘For 
illegalities at the bottom of the scale, the government does not give the 
impression it wants to consolidate the rule of law.’ (Kathimerini, 
09/02/2003, my translation)
10
 
 
                                                 
8 
This is what Gezelius calls the ‘pseudo legitimacy’ of the law (Gezelius 2003). 
9
 One’s own perception of how much ‘harm’ one is causing to third parties by violating public 
rules might be, of course, short-sighted and therefore underestimated. Perhaps remarkable 
in that respect is the following extract from a piece published in Kathimerini, differentiating 
theft from the public administration from theft ‘on the road’, less legitimate because it 
actually risks the physical well-being of others:  
‘When cheating (otan kleveis) the taxman, the Public Electricity Company or the Public 
Water Company (…), you eventually steal something trivial, whether you measure it in 
drachmas or in euros. But when you steal on the road (kleveis sto dromo), you may steal 
from people that were to blame for nothing.’ (Kathimerini, 03/10/2004, my translation). 
10
 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_ell_2_09/02/2003_53087; accessed 22 
November 2012. 
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In the case of catalytic exhaust pipes already discussed earlier, although 
the inspection services of the Secretariat for Transport have been 
historically under-resourced to enforce the legislation in the streets, this 
has not been the case of the police, which has been provided a fleet of 
specially equipped vehicles to detect excessive pollution, yet has not 
used them to enforce the law (Kathimerini, 14/10/2001). In its 2005 
annual report, the Greek Ombudsman also noted the non-revocation of 
a great many driving licences that were either forged or delivered on the 
basis of irregular supporting documents, although the competent 
authority to revoke these titles could easily do so (Greek Ombudsman, 
2005: 40).  
Illegal constructions have not led to much in terms of enforcement 
either: illegally built houses have been left standing and new 
constructions have been periodically legalized. For instance, in 2006 
property titles were passed on to 70,000 ‘squatters’ who had built 
illegally on publicly owned land (Kathimerini, 19/07/2006). Access to 
electricity supply has also been facilitated for several thousands of 
illegally built houses (Kathimerini, 27/07/2005). Enforcement against 
illegal businesses has been also weak and ineffective in spite of the fact 
that many of them are easily identified, such as those on Glyfada’s 
coastline, possibly the busiest coastline in the country (Kathimerini 
29/06/2002). Similar observations can be made with regard to benefit 
fraud and tax evasion.  
One might also consider the fact that new infrastructures were also 
designed in ways that facilitate non-compliance (or at least do not 
discourage it). For example, the metro stations in Athens, albeit very 
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modern and designed appropriately for large crowds of passengers 
(unlike the London tube, for example), do not include a gated system, 
unlike in many other countries. The recently completed Acropolis 
museum in Athens also offers visitors the option of skipping payment of 
an entrance ticket if they claim to wish only to visit the museum’s café.
11
  
There is inconclusive but suggestive evidence that strategic low or 
inexistent enforcement of small illegalities may be linked with the 
electoral cycle and the satisfaction of special interests in exchange of 
political support (Artavanis et al. 2012; Skouras and Christodoulakis 
2011; Spanou 1996). In addition to that possibility, some of the examples 
presented earlier suggest that non-enforcement cannot always be 
explained away as a clearly identified transaction between politicians 
and particular groups. Rather, state inaction appears to often benefit the 
population at large without distinction between groups and their 
political affiliations to clearly identifiable patrons. This translates into 
expectations of non-enforcement or leniency from the part of state 
agents and for a number of offences. As Herzfeld remarks on Cretan 
artisans, openness about their defiance of the law combines with 
‘evident confiden[ce] about the authorities’ pragmatic acquiescence’ 
(Herzfeld 2004: 16; for additional evidence, from general everyday 
policing to environmental regulation, see Hirschon 2008 and Spanou 
1996). There are additional hints of such expectations in the public’s 
reactions to sanctioning: for example, there were violent collective 
reactions on the island of Hydra in August 2012 after an agent from the 
                                                 
11
 This has not been the case for all new infrastructures, however.  
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tax administration carried out an assessment of the extent of tax evasion 
and sanctioned a fraudster (Kathimerini, 20/08/2012).
12
  
These elements combined together constitute a pattern that could be 
summarized as ‘controlled negative reciprocity’ between members of 
civil society and the state. It is negative in the sense that many of the 
behaviours reviewed are harmful to the other ‘party’, yet it is controlled 
in the sense that mutually harmful conduct has been generally non-
violent and not severe in its intended consequences. The inner motives 
for these behaviours are probably a complicated mix of things, as it is 
usually the case with behaviours in every-day regulatory encounters (e.g. 
Etienne 2011; May 2005; Nielsen and Parker 2012), and certainly 
combine material and symbolic dimensions. In other words, 
opportunism would likely be a determinant motivation behind non-
compliance and non-enforcement, but also anti-authoritarian values 
that can be identified from the widespread tendencies to blame the 
state, mock compliers, and praise cunning evaders (Herzfeld 2005).
13
 
Additionally, one can hypothesize that unwritten social norms would be 
playing a role by controlling harmful behaviours and henceforth limiting 
the extent of negative reciprocity between members of civil society and 
state agents.  
                                                 
12
 http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_20/08/2012_457422   
13
 Resentment at the state is certainly not a typically Greek thing. It can be seen in more 
general terms as an acknowledgment of the threat to one’s autonomy posed by almost any 
regulation in any country (e.g. Braithwaite 2009). Hence, without the compensation of 
legitimacy, regulatory demands might trigger negative reactions (e.g. Waller 2007) and 
possibly non-compliance. However, one could also see in the negative perception of the 
state one of the expressions of the Greek value of self-regard, which motivates and justifies 
challenging others’ claim to authority (e.g. Hirschon 2008). 
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I would like to argue that, far from being the product of chance – such as 
a combination of deeply ingrained opportunism and a weak state (e.g. 
Doxiadis 2011; Tsoukalas 1995) – this pattern is a coherent form. Thus, 
in the remaining of this article I will argue that these combined 
observations can be theorized as a particular type of state-society 
relationship, although this form of interpretation can appear at first sight 
as incompatible with what is commonly understood as a ‘relationship’. 
3. From controlled negative reciprocity to relationships of 
hostility  
To both scholars and non-scholars the idea that controlled negative 
reciprocity would be a form of state-society relationship might at first 
sound like a contradiction in terms. In socio-legal and regulation studies, 
which have given considerable attention to the micro-level interactions 
between members of civil society and the state, ‘relationships’ between 
‘regulator’ and ‘regulated’ tend to be ‘cooperative’ or at least to hold the 
promise of cooperation, possibly even trust. Since a ‘relational’ approach 
to enforcement in repeated encounters is implicitly cooperative, it is 
sometimes advocated normatively as a way of building trust and 
achieving cooperation between members of civil society and state 
agents (e.g. Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Hawkins 2002; Silbey 2011; 
Tyler 1997). Conversely, hostility and non-compliance are implicitly 
deemed irregularities destructive of relationships, and therefore short-
lived.
14
 It is assumed so generally because the state would eventually 
                                                 
14
 Coglianese (1996) constitutes a very rare case in the socio-legal / regulation literature that 
explores an empirical case of a durable relationship between a regulator and a regulatee 
that is marred by regular occurrences of mutually hostile behaviour (in the form of 
litigation). 
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coerce the defiant into compliance; or it would educate and convince 
the regulated that they should comply; or the state would understand 
resistance from civil society as an indication that it has gone too far, and 
would adapt by renouncing to contested requests, thus restoring a 
cooperative ‘relationship’. In other words, hostility in the form of 
negative reciprocity – tit for tat without evolution towards cooperation – 
would characterize interactions where state agents show no ‘relational 
consideration’ and make an insensitive application of the rules (e.g. 
Bardach and Kagan [1982] 2002; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). It might 
also be characteristic of one-off interactions where the parties do not 
have the time to build a relationship (Etienne 2013; e.g. Waller 2007).  
There is, however, ground to argue that seeing hostility as an irregularity 
or a threat to relationships may be culture-bound and anchored in a 
normative ideal that is not shared across all socio-political contexts 
(Broome 1990). Rather, antagonism might be a constitutive element of a 
relationship rather than a threat to that relationship’s existence. It might 
even constitute a form of equilibrium and as such be durable, although 
how that may be the case requires further theoretical enquiry. In order 
to bring theoretical substance to this idea, which may help to make 
sense of the Greek case as well as possible other contexts of state-
society interactions, I borrow from and combine in the following 
paragraphs the insights of four social scientists: Georg Simmel, John K. 
Campbell, Alvin Gouldner and Pierre Clastres.
15
 
                                                 
15
 In spite of appearances, this is not an internally inconsistent bunch of references. 
Campbell explicitly refers to Simmel’s sociology of conflict and antagonism (Simmel 1955) in 
the writings I borrow from (Campbell 1964), and Clastres presents ideas of antagonism 
between society and the (possibility of a) state in his opus Society Against the State (Clastres 
1987) that can also be accommodated with Simmelian sociology. Finally, in Patterns of 
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3.1 Simmel 
The argument in its simplest form was proposed by Georg Simmel 
(1955), a theoretical sociologist. He writes: ‘while antagonism by itself 
does not produce sociation, it is a sociological element almost never 
absent in it’ (p. 25). Indeed, the almost universal existence of a 
socializing factor alongside antagonism is revealed by restraint in the 
expression of hostility. Thus, the fact that acts of mutual hostility are 
controlled in one way or another (for example by the ‘laws of war’ in 
military conflict) implies an element of commonness. Thanks to the 
latter, it is imaginable that, even in repeated interactions marred by 
violence, there is the potential for future non-violent interactions, ‘even 
though this new relation may contain a completely undiminished sum of 
animosity between the two parties.’ (p. 26). Most importantly, Simmel 
insists that the presence of hostility in human interactions is such a 
general aspect (with wide variations in intensity) that it does not make 
sense to consider it in any other way than as a constitutive element of 
relationships, for instance in marriages marred by a certain amount of 
conflict. 
3.2 Campbell 
The anthropologist J.K. Campbell has further developed this line of 
thought and has added some empirical and theoretical flesh to it. 
Campbell’s analysis bears on Greece, but at a different level of analysis 
than the relationship between state and society. In his landmark study of 
the Sarakatsani (Campbell 1964), a community of (then nomad) 
                                                                                                                                            
Industrial Bureaucracy, Gouldner (1954) develops an analysis of antagonism between 
authority internal and external to organisations that fits also the Simmelian approach (as 
argued by Katz 1977).  
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shepherds from Northern Greece, Campbell discusses at length distrust 
and competitive hostility between unrelated families inside the 
community. Among the Sarakatsani, hostility manifested itself in various 
forms, yet it rarely turned to physical violence. One of the most vivid and 
yet non-violent expressions of hostility was mutual animal theft 
(ζωοκλοπή
16
) and mutual grass theft. Mutual theft was a dynamic 
element that touched all members of the community: as one shepherd 
would steal from another, the latter would generally commit theft in 
turn, to recover his losses and save his honour (which would imply 
committing a bigger theft than the one suffered). Yet, since the wronged 
shepherd would not generally know who stole from him, he would likely 
steal from a third shepherd, who would then retaliate, and so on and so 
forth. In other words, negative reciprocity would not only be dyadic tit 
for tat, it could be also diffuse within a bigger group.  
Observing that a combination of negative mutual expectations (distrust) 
and reciprocated mutually harmful acts – of which mutual theft was only 
the most institutionalized form – was a normal dimension of social 
interactions in that community, Campbell followed Simmel’s insights and 
proposed to consider hostility as constitutive rather than destructive of 
what were otherwise stable and highly homogeneous social groups. 
Alluding to Marcel Mauss’ idea of gift and counter-gift as constitutive of 
another kind of relationship (Mauss 1954), he defined hostility 
relationships as produced and reproduced by theft and counter-theft. 
‘Hostility is a kind of relationship, and providing it is limited in such 
a way that it cannot succeed in its ultimate aim, that is the 
                                                 
16
 Animal theft has been widespread in other rural areas of Greece. See for instance Herzfeld 
(1985) for an extensive discussion of animal theft in Crete. 
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annihilation of the adversary, it may represent an important 
element in the pattern of social relations of a community. This is 
the case among the Sarakatsani (…). Obviously the ability of one 
man to get at another is always an important factor in a 
relationship of hostility. But these behaviours are also controlled, 
partially at any rate, in the competitive forms through which they 
are acted out. And it is perhaps not unprofitable to consider theft in 
the general context of competitive gift exchange. The victim, both 
from honour and self-interest, is obliged to commit a counter-theft. 
Like the return gift in other societies, the return theft amongst the 
Sarakatsani should ideally be greater than the original theft. Like 
series of prestations and counter-prestations, in theory a series of 
thefts never ends, for after each reciprocal act an amount of debt 
remains.’ (Campbell 1964: 211)  
Like Simmel, Campbell insisted that behaviours signalling hostility were 
controlled, so that they would not trigger a truly destructive spiral. In 
other words, the Sarakastani would use self-restraint in the way they 
would harm one another, and they would use physical violence (and 
murder) only in last resort. There was no ‘measure of co-operation’ in 
such restraint, however: only ‘a structural imperative’ to avoid mutual 
destruction (ibid.), informed by norms shared between all shepherds on 
what was utterly unacceptable behaviour (rape, murder) and would call 
for the ultimate act of reciprocity to clear the honour of the family 
(murder of the offender or of one of his kin).
17
 Campbell thus further 
                                                 
17 
Herzfeld (2005) discusses also how the dangers of negative reciprocity between Cretan 
shepherds are controlled, for instance by holding ‘peace-making’ oath ceremonials, where 
debts and animosity accumulated between two individuals as a result of multiple acts of 
negative reciprocity may be cancelled. 
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details Simmel’s insights by characterizing relationships of hostility as 
constituted and perpetuated by acts of negative reciprocity limited by 
considerations of self-interest and social norms (of honour and decency). 
As such, it echoes some of the observations made earlier on the basis of 
more scattered and yet suggestive evidence on interactions between 
members of civil society and state agents in Greece. 
That being said, acts of controlled negative reciprocity in Campbell’s 
analysis were taking place between equals. Controlled negative 
reciprocity is likely to look differently when taking place between 
members of civil society and the state, that is, between inferior and 
superior. It is not that theft and counter-theft are unthinkable in that 
kind of relationship, in symbolic or legal terms. In the Greek context, 
non-payments of bills by the state or requests for cash from the part of 
public agents on the one hand, and cases of non-compliance from the 
part of members of civil society on the other hand, can be seen (and are 
often seen
18
) as theft and counter-theft. However, capacities of nuisance 
against the other party are certainly much greater for the state than for 
the individual citizen. It is notably that advantage that the state 
sometimes would use to circumvent rules. In fact, the apportionment of 
forces tends to be so asymmetrical in the state’s favour that it would be 
rational for the state to threaten to use that power, so as to push 
individuals or firms into compliance. That would be what most rational 
choice scholars in political science and regulation theory would expect.
19
 
Therefore, self-restraint from the part of the state when facing 
                                                 
18
 ‘Theft’ is quite literally a word used to speak about non-compliance in Greece, even when 
no physical object or amount of money are effectively stolen. See note 9. 
19
 That is the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ argument in political science (e.g. Heritier and Lehmkuhl 
2008), and the ‘benign big gun’ argument in regulation studies (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
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widespread non-compliance might be a priori a puzzle, something 
seemingly irrational. To make sense of that puzzle, one might borrow 
from two other authors who have discussed interactions within 
contested hierarchies in a proto-Simmelian fashion: Alvin Gouldner and 
Pierre Clastres. 
3.3 Gouldner 
An organizational sociologist, Alvin Gouldner has described relations 
between managers and workers in an industrial organization in the U.S. 
(Gouldner 1954). It is certainly not a state-society context, yet it is clearly 
a hierarchical and asymmetric relationship. In his ethnographic work, 
Gouldner found that certain rules were neither enforced by managers 
nor obeyed by workers. Gouldner called that pattern ‘mock 
bureaucracy.’ Such ‘winking at the rules’ (Hodson et al. 2012) from the 
part of those supposed to enforce them, he found, nurtured a sense of 
solidarity between management and the workforce, in spite of a 
background of mutual antagonism. It gave the impression that 
superordinates, like subordinates, did not consider these rules to be 
legitimate or authoritative (as noted also, in the Greek context, by 
Spanou 1996).  
In effect, such strategic non-enforcement
20
 contributed to keeping the 
peace. It also opened venues for cooperative arrangements in other 
domains: because they tolerated non-compliance with certain rules, 
superordinates could also obtain subordinates’ cooperation and 
                                                 
20
 Non-enforcement might be seen as evidence of ‘capture’, however capture as it is 
generally understood in regulation studies occurs ‘at the prodding of outside interests.’ 
Strategic non-enforcement in relationships of hostility would rather qualify as ‘self-inflicted 
capture’, that is capture ‘as a conscious choice of the regulators involved’ (Litz 1995: 420). 
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compliance with other rules than those that were not enforced. In other 
words, Gouldner found that there was a transactional element in the 
non-enforcement of certain rules by the powerful party. Yet that was a 
diffuse transaction, in the sense that non-enforcement was not traded in 
exchange for a specific counter-performance, but rather as a means to 
maintain a certain amount of willingness to cooperate from the part of 
subordinates. What Gouldner hinted at in his own work was not only the 
strategic non-enforcement of rules by superordinates, but also the anti-
authoritarian dispositions of subordinates. These dispositions made non-
enforcement a useful counter-measure for managers. To a certain point, 
they could also make non-enforcement a necessity, and that is the limit 
case that the work of Clastres has looked into. 
3.4 Clastres  
The anthropologist Pierre Clastres has studied Amerindian societies. The 
chief in these societies is a powerless figure, or rather a figure whose 
power ‘depends on the good will of the group’: ‘a planner of the group’s 
economic and ceremonial activities, the leader possesses no decision-
making power; he is never certain that his “orders” will be carried out’ 
(Clastres 1987: 37), ‘for the chief’s word carries no force of law’ (p. 206; 
emphasis in original). In other words, the group is inherently hostile to 
any attempt of the chief to demand obedience unless it sees some utility 
or necessity in the chief’s projects. There is thus opportunism in the 
group’s compliance or non-compliance with the chief’s orders. Yet there 
is also a deep distrust of the superordinate figure that transpires in all 
encounters between the chief and the group, and translates into 
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dispositions to resist the chief’s orders when these seem to exceed 
particular limits.  
Because there is so much distrust in the overarching figure in these 
societies, the chief’s main role and main goal is to keep the peace. 
Indeed, he would generally be careful not to try to enforce anything new 
or push society into crisis for this would likely fail. Indeed: ‘the outbreak 
of a crisis that would destroy internal harmony calls for the intervention 
of power, but simultaneously gives rise to that intention to contest 
which the chief has not the means to overcome.’ (Clastres 1987: 37) 
Clastres’ argument is about societies that have no state. However, even 
in societies with a state, and beyond the apparatus of bureaucracy, one 
might recognize an acknowledgement that the state should not enforce 
rules that members of civil society are able and likely to oppose, as this 
would possibly undermine the peaceful coexistence between state and 
civil society. This has illustrations in Greece that range from the 
mundane to the dramatic. Among the first ones, there is the refusal from 
many motorcyclists to wear protective helmets on their heads. There is 
also the notorious episode of defiance of a law that imposed early 
closure on nightclubs (2.30am or 3.30am instead of 5.30am) in 1994. 
That law was openly challenged: a giant open air nightclub was set up on 
Syntagma Square (right in front of the Parliament), where parties would 
take place until well later than the legal limit hour. More dramatically, as 
the sovereign debt crisis unfolded and painful austerity measures were 
taken, already active dispositions within civil society to counteract the 
state with reciprocal negative behaviours have flared up, leading to 
frequent and widespread demonstrations and riots. These recent 
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evolutions point also to the nature of the equilibrium in hostile state-
society relationships. 
In sum, the insights of Simmel, Campbell, Gouldner and Clastres may be 
combined together to draw the ideal type of a relationship of hostility 
between inferior and superior, as it might exist in state-society 
interactions. Such a relationship is characterised by non-cooperative acts 
of negative reciprocity, which recurrently harm the other party. These 
acts are, however, controlled in at least three ways: firstly, by 
considerations of self-interest; secondly, by shared social norms 
specifying which acts of negative reciprocity are acceptable and which 
are not; and thirdly, by the necessity to maintain peace overall.
21
 These 
elements interactively shape expectations of both superiors and 
inferiors: the state is expected (and thought) to be a negative element in 
people’s lives, and individual members of civil society are expected to 
retaliate against the state. However, both types of negative acts are also 
expected to be limited in their severity. These elements have empirical 
illustrations in the Greek context, even though Greece undoubtedly has 
idiosyncrasies that are not included in this ideal-type of state-society 
relationship. 
4. Discussion/Conclusions 
The ideal-type of controlled negative reciprocity between state and 
society can be distinguished from other types of state-society 
relationships. Logically, one could imagine a relationship where negative 
                                                 
21
 The first consideration exists purely at the individual level. The other two rather 
correspond to system-level goals that protect collective interests. 
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reciprocity would be uncontrolled, although that would certainly be a 
limit-case applying to marginal groups.  
There may be also different types of relationships characterized by 
positive reciprocity. Among these, an important type for Western 
scholars is that which corresponds best to the theory of the social 
contract: members of civil society would comply in exchange for public 
goods. That basic idea of reciprocal exchange can be detailed further by 
adding that the relationship would depend also on respecting principles 
of justice in state-society interactions and enforcing non-compliance by 
others
22
 (e.g. Feld and Frey 2007; Scholz 2003). It is within that ideal-
type that the notion of civil disobedience is the more meaningful, since it 
implies that informed and active citizens would carefully scrutinize the 
extent of their obligations to the state with reference to a set of 
principles. In other words, they would ‘divest’ authority by refuse to 
comply when they disagree with the acts or the demands of the state 
(Coleman 1980).
23
 
Another type of state-society relationship also defined by positive 
reciprocity can be found in the exchanges of gifts and counter-gifts in 
encounters between state agents and members of civil society. For 
example, a police officer may circumvent procedures in order to speed 
up the process of delivering an authorization for a civilian, who in return 
provides to the officer a service (health care, gardening, etc.) without 
charge. Such positive reciprocity is embedded in other structures of 
interpersonal relationships than in mutual hostility (Granovetter, 2007).  
                                                 
22
 This is Levi’s idea of ‘contingent compliance’ (Levi 1997). 
23
 This corresponds to the American tradition of compliance as consent (Arendt 1972; 
Coleman 1980; Pyrcz 1981). 
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Ultimately, one may also consider the possibility of non-reciprocal state-
society relationships. Thus, an authority relationship is a purely vertical 
one between superior and inferior, in which the orders from the state 
must be obeyed by subordinates (e.g. Arendt 1958). Free riding would 
be another non-reciprocal relationship, whereby some members of civil 
society take advantage of public goods provided by the state while 
shirking the costs of these goods. 
Negative reciprocity Positive reciprocity No reciprocity 
controlled hostility social contract free riding 
uncontrolled hostility gift and counter-gift authority 
 
The published literature on Greece has given varied credence to these 
various ideal-types. There is little support for the idea that state-society 
relationships in Greece resemble the social contract picture of positive 
reciprocity. There is, however, evidence of episodic civil disobedience, 
particularly during the crisis, suggesting that a social contract has been in 
place, and has been put under increasing strain by the crisis. The ‘I don’t 
pay’ movement that emerged in that period (Financial Times, 
09/03/2011), or the almost systematic non-compliance of universities 
with a reform voted in 2011 that weakens professorial and student 
union control over university governance (Abbott 2012) might be 
considered examples of civil disobedience. There is also evidence of a 
social contract type of relationship in popular frustration towards the 
state because of the non-enforcement of a number of ‘borderline’ illegal 
activities, such as drug trafficking, squatting, arson, or looting. 
Expectations of public order enforcement have become far stronger 
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than they were before. The far right has flourished politically as a result 
of such growing demands for security. 
By contrast, the more personalised gift and counter-gift kind of 
relationship can be observed extensively in Greece, and notably within 
kinship or friendship networks, or under the umbrella of a patron-client 
relationship (e.g. Herzfeld, 1992). Thus, as noted by Spanou, state-
society relationships in Greece can also be ‘a feature of the person-to-
person tradition of relationships with decision-making centres, whereby 
those involved can procure certain advantages by short-circuiting the 
obligations and legal constraints’ (Spanou, 1996: 228; for similar 
observations in other countries, see: Lonmitz, 1988; Pakulski, 1986). 
Recently, Doxiadis (2011) has also argued that the behaviours of Greeks 
in relation to their state was best described as that of free riders. He 
writes: ‘Greek opportunism, I believe, is the normal behaviour of the 
homo economicus, the ‘rational egoist’; the opportunist defects in the 
absence of strong enforcement of rules.’ Tsoukalas has argued that pro-
social values and norms lost their force in the second half of the 20
th
 
Century, which would include what Pollis in the 1960s saw as ‘the 
population’s submissive attitudes towards authority’ (Pollis, 1965: 41). 
At the same time, encouragements to be egoistic and materialistic, 
which accompanied the transition towards a consumerist society, have 
been particularly successful, transforming Greece into a nation a ‘free 
riders’ (Tsoukalas, 1995).  
There is little support in the literature on contemporary Greece (after 
Pollis, 1965) for a view of state-society relationships in Greece are 
characterised by deference to authority. Rather, the anthropological 
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literature (e.g. Hirschon, 2008, 2012) as well as more recent 
commentary by academics on social tensions in Greece (e.g. 
Andronikidou and Kovras, 2012; Kalyvas, 2008; Tsakiridou, 2008) 
suggests that there are strong anti-authoritarian dispositions among the 
Greek population, linked both to notions of self-regard as well as to a 
more recent political culture that has developed after the fall of the 
dictatorship in the 1970s. Hirschon (2012) has also proposed to apply to 
the Greek case the notion of ‘cultural resistance’ developed by James 
Scott (1985) in order to make sense of forms of resistance to power and 
authority by relatively powerless and poor peasants in Malaysia.  
It is important to note that different groups within Greek society would 
likely have different relationships with the state, therefore these various 
perspectives might each hold a portion of the truth of state-society 
relationships in Greece. In this paper I have argued that ‘controlled 
negative reciprocity’ constitutes another type of state-society 
relationship unaccounted for by the current literature and that it is 
relevant in the Greek case as well.  
This relationship is characterized by mutual negative expectations: the 
state is expected to be a pain for the citizen, and the citizen is expected 
to make the state pay for it. In other words, there is generalized mutual 
distrust. Yet that distrust does not imply mutual alienation: there is also 
an element of commonness that has ruled expressions of distrust. This is 
revealed in the way negative reciprocity is controlled. Widespread social 
norms condemning a range of harmful behaviours play a role in this 
control. The strategic non-enforcement of a number of public rules 
applicable in the realm where most illegal behaviour happens is another 
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aspect of the control over negative reciprocity. Hence, rather than a 
principle-agent problem of citizens being insufficiently monitored and 
sanctioned by the state, the issue of extensive minor illegalities in 
Greece can also be understood as a collective action problem (Persson et 
al. 2012), as both state authorities and civil society share expectations of 
negative reciprocity and self-restraint. 
The argument in this paper has implications for the way at least two 
other elements of the state-society relationship in Greece in crisis are 
understood. Firstly, many of the decisions that were taken by the state 
under the lenders’ pressure have not so much constituted a novelty, but 
on the contrary have fitted and worsened an enduring pattern of 
behaviour harmful (or perceived to be so) for members of civil society, 
combined with a good measure of non-enforcement for minor 
illegalities. As the costs imposed on members of civil society have 
increased (in the form of more unpaid suppliers, further delayed and 
reduced benefits in public service counters), already active dispositions 
within civil society to counteract the state with reciprocal negative 
behaviours have flared up. Secondly, the growing international pressure 
on the state to enforce minor illegalities, which it has begun to exercise 
with great difficulty, has started to put a much greater strain than before 
on the relationship between the state and civil society precisely because 
it implies giving away an essential component of that relationship: the 
strategic non-enforcement of multiple public rules. 
Beyond the Greek case, the ideal-type of controlled negative reciprocity 
in state-society relationships may also hold for other country cases. 
Indeed, there are hints in the published literature that for certain 
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sections of society in various countries, the interaction with the state is 
also characterized by mutually harmful behaviour and an element of 
self-restraint. For instance, in Russia, the habit of the state not to pay 
suppliers on time has been a correlate of tax evasion by those same 
suppliers (Aitken 2001). In China, He has identified a pattern of non-
compliance among rural immigrants coming to work in cities, who 
collude with locals to evade a discriminatory legal treatment. This ‘legal 
collusion’ is tolerated by enforcement authorities, which tend to 
exercise self-restraint (He 2005). 
More generally, expressions of dissent involving both active resistance 
and more mundane but nevertheless consequential disengagement from 
the state have increased in Europe and North America. In the U.S. the 
Tea Party has become a major influence on the Republican Party; the 
mix of anti-statism and patriotism that it embodies can also be 
encountered frequently in Greece. Elsewhere, Habermas has discussed 
how various elements in current day Germany – indicated by such 
events as the rise of the Wutbürger in Stuttgart in 2009 – suggest a 
growing hostility towards the state from previously less vocal parts of 
civil society (e.g. Habermas 2010). I would suggest that these might be 
the more visible elements of an otherwise mostly invisible set of 
attitudes and behaviours towards the state that might be described in 
terms of their relative proximity with the ideal type of a hostile state-
society relationship characterised by controlled negative reciprocity.  
This should be of particular relevance for any analysis of the changing 
state-society relationship in an era of austerity, which implies that the 
state would provide less and impose more, especially in terms of tax and 
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restrictions on individual liberties. In such context, negative reciprocity 
might become the perceived experience of interactions with the state 
for an increasingly large proportion of the population in North America 
and Europe, as it has been for a swath of developing countries subject to 
IMF programmes in the past decades.  
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